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whether certain underground tanks were immovables by des-
tination to determine whether there was a right to severance
damages to the tanks. The case had interesting facts in that
the premises were used not merely as a business, but as a
multiple-type commercial enterprise-a combined grocery, filling
station, and cafe. Since the tanks were for the "service and
improvement" of the overall enterprise to which the land was
devoted, the decision seems to be in accord with the plain letter
of article 468 in affirmatively deciding the question.
Beavers v. Butler,7 although clearly not concerned with prop-
erty problems, titillates a student of the property aspects of our
ever-changing waterbodies. It held that the construction of a
dam across a bayou in the creation of Lake D'Arbonne did not
effect a change in its status as a navigable stream. While this
holding was apparently only concerned with navigability, the
question arises as to whether the status of a waterbody as a
stream or a lake cannot be changed by works of man. In view
of this writer's former involvement as counsel in State v. Cock-
rell," which had similar issues that may be reconsidered in pend-
ing litigation, further comment is not made.
For similar reasons, evaluation by this writer of Gray v.
Department of Highways9 would not be in order. The Supreme
Court held, among other things, that article 507 was not appli-
cable to a claim by landowners for dirt value and damages to
land caused by alleged unauthorized use of land as a borrow
pit and incorporation of the dirt in a roadbed owned in full
ownership by the state.
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
PENSIONS AND ANNUITIES
In the 1965-66 term the Court of Appeal for the Second
Circuit had occasion to note, but not to decide, that although
pensions and other benefits under the Teachers' Retirement Sys-
7. 188 So.2d 725 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966), writ refue d, 249 La. 739, 190
So.2d 242 (1966).
8. 162 So.2d 361 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), writ relused, 246 La. 343, 164
So.2d 350 (1964).
9. 250 La. 1045, 202 So.2d 24 (1967).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
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tem legislation are the separate assets of the teacher spouse,
he or she may be obliged at the termination of the regime
to reimburse the other spouse one-half the earnings during
marriage contributed to such pension or benefit arrangements.1
In the 1966-67 term the same court had occasion to decide the
particular issue and did so in the affirmative.2 A related ques-
tion was presented in Succession of Videau.8 Although R.S.
22:647 declares the '"proceeds and avails" of life insurance and
endowment contracts to belong to the "beneficiary, assignee,
or payee, including the insured's estate," and those of annuity
contracts to the "beneficiary, assignee, or payee, including the
annuitant's estate," the judiciary has continued to interpose as
a prior question the community or separate character of the
acquisition if the husband is the insured or annuitant and he or
his succession is the beneficiary. Thus in Videau the court rea-
soned that, in spite of R.S. 22:647, a pension annuity contrib-
uted to by the husband and his employer during the existence
of the community of acquets and gains and payable to him as
beneficiary was, at the termination of the regime by his wife's
death, a community asset. The purpose of a retirement annuity
being support after income from employment has ceased, the
result reached by the jurisprudence defeats that purpose by fifty
percent. Here, for example, the wife's heirs, not the intended
annuitant, received half the value of the annuity. It may be
asked whether it would not be advisable to legislate the separate
character of all life insurance and annuity interests, not simply
teacher retirement pensions. Whether the non-benefiting spouse
or his or her heirs should be entitled to reimbursement for half
the community funds used in paying premiums is in any event
not the same question, even if sometimes the values of the
premiums paid and the proceeds might approach each other.
Here again, however, it might not be incorrect to consider the
premiums for normal insurance and annuity benefits for the
spouses and their dependents as "expenses of the marriage" and
therefore not subject to accounting or restitution between the
spouses. As noted by the writer in last year's Symposium, there
is need for legislation on this point.4
1. Scott v. Scott, 179 So.2d 656 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
2. Moore v. Moore, 187 So.2d 145 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
3. 197 So.2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
4. 27 A. L. Rev. 457 (1967).
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COMMINGLED FuNDs
Another issue in the Succession of Videau5 was whether the
husband, at his wife's death, could demand reimbursement of
approximately $52,000 in separate funds which had been com-
mingled with community assets. Recovery was allowed, the court
finding as fact from circumstantial evidence that the funds must
have been used to the benefit of community assets or to defray
obligations chargeable to the community. Three observations
may be made. First, although the Civil Code does not contain
an article on the subject, it does contain a provision, article 2408,
requiring an accounting between the spouses at the termination
of the regime when common effort or assets have been used to
augment the separate patrimony of either. It seems eminently
logical that if there must be an accounting for separate gains
from common effort or funds, there should also be an accounting
for common gains from separate effort or funds. Secondly, how-
ever, the accounting which article 2408 prescribes is not in terms
of the value of the effort or assets contributed, but in terms of
the increase in value of the assets, as of the termination of the
regime, attibutable to the effort or assets contributed. The opin-
ion in Videau taken in its totality seems to indicate the com-
munity assets may have been increased in value by an amount
exceeding that of Mr. Videau's commingled separate funds. If
such was the case, the accounting should have been on that
basis to satisfy the principle of article 2408. Thirdly, it may be
noted that although the court speaks of "the community" reim-
bursing the "separate" patrimony of Mr. Videau, the Civil Code
does not indicate this method of accounting. On the contrary,
article 2408 indicates that when the separate assets of a spouse
have been augmented in value by common efforts or funds, the
spouse who is owner of the separate assets is to reimburse the
other spouse one-half the increase.6 Applying the same prin-
ciple to the case- at hand, the court should have ordered Mr.
Videau reimbursed one-half the augmented value of the com-
munity assets from his deceased spouse's undivided share of the
community assets or her separate assets, at her election.
INJUNCTION AGAINST DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY ASSETS
Article 149 of the Civil Code allows the wife, "for the pres-
ervations of her rights," to obtain an injunction restraining the
5. 197 So.2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
6. The principle seems recognized in Succession of Edmondson, 192
So.2d 892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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husband, pending suit for separation or divorce, from disposing
of "the movables and immovables in his possession." In Cook v.
Liming7 such an injunction had been obtained, but then, with
the wife's consent, the husband had alienated certain securities
forming part of the community of acquets and gains. In spite
of the wife's consent, the lower court, on the wife's rule, (1)
found the husband in contempt for selling the securities and
(2) ordered him to pay to the wife one-half the price received
therefor even though judgment in the separation suit had not
yet been rendered. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment.
Certainly this was error. First of all, the injunction can be and
was issued only at the wife's request. This being so, the wife's
consent to the sale of the stock amounted to a consent to the
modification of the injunction to that extent. An injunction of
this kind cannot be contended to have any greater dignity than
legislation enacted for the benefit of particular persons rather
than the general good, and article 11 of the Civil Code permits
persons to contract away their rights under such legislation.
Secondly, even if the husband had violated the injunction, the
action taken by the court would have been improper. Until
dissolution of the community regime by judgment in the separa-
tion suit or otherwise, the wife has no right to a partition of the
community assets in whole or in part. Thirdly, article 3611 of
the Code of Civil Procedure does not admit of the judgment
rendered. The court might have caused a rescission of the sale
of the securities, subject to third parties' rights, and might have
given the wife, after termination of the regime, such damages
as she might have sustained because of the sale. Here no dam-
ages could have been shown unless the principal suit had
resulted in a separation judgment, for then the community of
acquets and gains would not have been terminated, and the
husband's sale of community movables cannot be complained
of by the wife without a showing he had disposed of them, as
article 2404 specifies, "by fraud, to injure his wife."
HUSBAND'S LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S PURCHASES
Lamonica v. Royal Furniture Co.8 repeats some old misunder-
standings and creates another. Mrs. Lamonica, apparently acting
in her own name, purchased a washer-dryer, which subsequently
was delivered to the family home. There was testimony that the
7. 188 So.2d 423 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
8. 197 So.2d 147 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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seller "mailed letters to" Mr. Lamonica on "three or four occa-
sions" within the next two months and ten days, at the end
of which time Mr. Lamonica "denied any responsibility." Sub-
sequent to this date, apparently, the seller filed suit and obtained
judgment for the price and other contract amounts against Mrs.
Lamonica alone, and thereafter the seller, without ever obtain-
ing a judgment against Mr. Lamonica, garnished the wages of
Mrs. Lamonica, which, under the jurisprudence, 9 though not
under the legislation, 0 are community assets. The Court of Ap-
peal for the First Circuit upheld the garnishment. The reasoning
of the court is somewhat lacking in clarity, but there are state-
ments indicating the garnishment was proper because (1) the
husband is liable for necessaries purchased by the wife, or (2)
the community was "liable for debts created for the benefit of
the community by her," and (3) in any event the husband
ratified the purchase by his failure to deny liability for the
machine and having "at least benefited by its use for several
months."
It should be elementary, after all, that a garnishment cannot
issue against community assets unless the husband's liability
for the principal debt has been declared by judgment.1 The
husband not having been made a judgment debtor, the wife's
wages, as commuriity assets under the control of the husband,
were not subject to garnishment. But, beyond that, was Mr.
Lamonica, or "the community," as the court put it, liable for
Mrs. Lamonica's purchase? It may be well to outline the legisla-
tion on this point, though it does deserve more extended treat-
ment:
(1) The wife cannot, as wife, incur any obligation which
can enter the community of acquets and gains; only the hus-
band's obligations ever enter the community; and a creditor
cannot obtain satisfaction out of community assets unless he is
first a creditor of the husband.12
(2) No legislation whatsoever renders the husband liable
for contractual obligations entered into by his wife merely
because she is his wife or even because the contract pertains to
9. Succession of Howell, 177 La. 276, 148 So. 48 (1933).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1920, no. 186.
11. LA. CODE OF CxvIL PROCEDURE, arts. 3503, 2411 (1960). The same court
had ruled correctly on the same issue in Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. v.
Perry, 186 So.2d 900 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
12. Implication of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2204, as amended, La. Acts 1926,
no. 96, and 131 (1870).
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the operation of the home or maintenance of the family. Article
1786, which states the husband is presumed by law to have
authorized the wife's "contracts for necessaries for herself and
family, where he does not himself provide them," speaks not
of authorization in the sense of mandate, but only of the author-
ization necessary to remove the wife's incapacity to contract by
reason of the marital power, an incapacity suffered today only
by the married woman under eighteen years of age.1 3 The
"authorization" here spoken of, in any event, is that to obligate
herself, not to obligate her husband.
(3) The married woman, nevertheless, may obligate her
husband as principal if she has a mandate from him1 4 or justifi-
ably acts as his negotiorum gestor;3 and she obligates him by her
acts in trade if she is a "public merchant" with his consent.8
(4) In the opinion of the writer, however, it is possible to
affirm that there is a custom consistent with law under which
the husband tacitly authorizes his wife to enter into such con-
tracts as husbands normally expect their wives to conclude for
them in the interest of maintaining the home and family,
and that such acts encompass more than "necessaries"; but the
wife's authority here being by mandate only, it may be revoked
by the husband at any time by appropriate action.
(5) The unauthorized act of the wife in the name of the
husband, like that of any person in the name of another, may
be ratified expressly; but implication from silence or inactivity
will not suffice under the legislation. 7
(6) If the wife has contracted in her own name, and not
in her husband's, the husband may not be held liable except
by reason of his having assumed her obligation, and proof of
any promise to pay the debt of a third person must be in
writing.5
Applying the above conclusions of law to the facts in La-
monica, it seems incontestable that the husband was not liable
for his wife's purchase. That the seller contracted with her
personally and not as mandatary of her husband seems suffi-
13. LA. R.S. 9:101-105 (1950).
14. LA. CIVIL CODn arts. 1787, as amended, La. Acts 1944, no. 49, and 3001
(1870).
15. Id. arts. 2295-2300.
16. Id. arts. 131, 1786.
17. Id. art. 3021.
1& Id. art. 2279.
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ciently clear from the fact the seller sued her alone and did not
join the husband in the suit; and if the wife's purchase was in
her name, there was not proof in writing he had assumed her
obligation. On the other hand, however, if it could be said she
had acted under the presumed customary tacit mandate, then
the husband would have been liable simply as the contracting
party without need to resort to the erroneous notions of ratifi-
cation by non-action or receipt of benefit, or of the wife's being
able to obligate "the community."
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
In Burke v. Besthoff Realty Co.,1 an attempt was made to
recover in solido against the owner and the lessee of premises
adjoining those of the plaintiff on the basis of article 667 of
the Civil Code, which limits the privilege of a proprietor to
do with his estate whatever he pleases by providing that he
cannot make any work on it which may be the cause of any
damage to his neighbor. On finding that the lessee was not
chargeable with fault, the action against him was dismissed.
There is some authority for the proposition that a long-term
lessee may be treated as having a proprietary interest for the
purpose of applying article 667.2 There is also authority for the
view that where the lessee, rather than the proprietor, is at
fault, the latter is not liable.3 The instant case held the pro-
prietor responsible on the basis of article 667, notwithstanding
an absence of fault on his part. Assuming that the acts in ques-
tion, the use of a large trash truck and its hydraulic equipment,
come within the purview of the article, the holding seems sound.
In LeBoeuf v. Malbrough,4 the public records doctrine was
held to protect a third person who purchased property subject
to a right of redemption after the period of redemption had
expired as against a claim that he knew the original vendor
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 196 So.2d 293 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
2. Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845
(1955); Devoke v. Yazoo & M. V. R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So.2d 816 (1947);
McGee v. Yazoo & M. V. R.R. 206 La. 121, 19 So.2d 21 (1944). See also Stone,
Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: Obligations of Neighborhood, 40 Tul. L. Rsv.
701 (1966).
3. See Muller v. Stone, 27 La. Ann. 123 (1875); Tunnage v. Eddy, 42
So.2d 382 (Orl. App. 1949). Cf. Comment, Strict Liability for Uses of Property
Under the Louisiana Civil Code, 20 LA. L. Riv. 378 (1960).
4. 188 So.2d 196 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
